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MIKHIAIL BAKHTIN AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON
LAW
Russell West Jr.
Abstract: Traditional legal analysis comprehends change in the common law over time as
a shifting legal response to different facts and circumstances. This approach does not examine
the internal mechanisms by which the meaning of a judicial opinion changes when cited in
later legal writing. Mikhail Bakhtin, a literary and cultural theorist, argued that any statement
can be understood only through the context in which it is uttered and that every change in
context causes a shift in the statement's meaning. This Comment analyzes the internal
mechanisms of judicial opinions in light of Bakhtin's theories. First, this Comment describes
one example of the general use of literary theory in legal analysis and through that example
places Bakhtin's work within the context of law and literature. Then, this Comment examines
the effect of citation throughout a line of product liability cases to illustrate the semantic shift
described in Bakhtin's theories and concludes by arguing that Bakhtin's theories offer a useful
extension of the application of literary theory to legal analysis.
Can we learn to ask of a particular opinion how it creates its own
authority, and what kind of conversation it establishes, with what
relation to democracy?'
A first-year law student is trained to analyze precedent in order to
argue a legal conclusion from a given set of facts. That student rarely
goes beyond the surface reasoning of the judicial opinions that make up
the bulk of the texts encountered in the first year of law school. Often,
that first-year student faces inconsistent opinions or unexplainable
changes in the common law over time. One traditional approach to
analyzing these inconsistencies has been to see the function of legal
opinions as balancing the need for continuing clear statements of the law
with the need to address changing social conditions. This view positions
the law somewhat apart from the society in which it operates and
assumes that society acts upon the law in generating these changes.
Alternatively, the use of literary theory in legal analysis offers a
means to describe changes in the common law in terms relative to the
judicial opinion itself. As authors, judges seem to create opinions as texts
that can be analyzed using methods appropriated from literary analysis.
As Professor White's' question above indicates, literary analysis asks
1. James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: an Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism 112
(1990) [hereinafter Justice].
2. Because of the repetition of names, this Comment consistently refers to James Boyd White as
"Professor White" and to Justice Byron White as "Justice White." Any reference simply to "White"
is to the defendant in United States v. White or to the case itself.
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questions of the opinion itself as a text created by an author in a certain
moment. While fruitful, many literary analyses of law are static because
they apply literary theories to one text, or a series of texts, frozen in time.
However, this analysis neglects relations over time. Texts are influenced
by those that precede them and influence those that follow them.
Additionally, each text's journey through time subjects it to shifts in
meaning engendered by those who use the traveling text when authoring
their own texts.
Judicial opinions are particularly subject to these changes. When an
author cites a judicial opinion, the cited opinion must support the
author's interpretation of the cited text. While literary theory provides an
analysis that carefully describes the uses of texts within an opinion, the
continuing relationship between the cited text and the citing text, a
relationship that forever effects the meaning of both texts, has not been
as carefully described.
The cultural and literary theories of Mikhail Bakhtin provide helpful
tools for describing this relationship.3 Bakhtin argued that any
statement's meaning is necessarily related to the context in which the
statement is uttered; any movement of this statement to a new context
carries a necessary shift in meaning. This condition, which Bakhtin
called "heteroglossia,"4 defines a dialogic world. "Dialogism,"5 the mode
through which knowledge is created under heteroglossia, excludes the
3. The theories of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) have since 1970 "exertec a spellbinding and
fertile power over critical imaginations in North America and Europe." David H. Richter, The
Critical Tradition 780 (1989) (placing Bakhtin in context of modem literary criticism). For a
complete bibliography of Bakhtin's works, see Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: the Dialogical
Principle 121-23 (1984). The most common introduction to Bakhtin's work is through his essay
Mikhail Bakhtin, Discourse in the Novel, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by MM.
Bakhtin 259 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) [hereinafter
Discourse]. Although Bakhtin addresses the social context of statements more thoroughly and
explicitly in his essays Mikhail Bakhtin, The Problem of Speech Genres, in Speech Genres and
Other Late Essays 60-102 (1986) and Mikhail Bakhtin, The Problem of the Tect, in Speech Genres
and Other Late Essays 103-31 (1986), this Comment uses ideas discussed in Discourse, supra, at
337-55.
4. Literally, heteroglossia refers to the different explanations of a word's meaning: "At any given
time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions-social, historical, meteorological,
physiological-that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning
different than it would have under any other conditions .... " Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic
Imagination: Four Essays by MM. Bakhtin 428 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist trans., 1981) [hereinafter Holquist, Dialogic Imagination].
5. Dialogism describes the relationship between utterances: "Everything means, is understood, as
a part of a greater whole-there is a constant interaction between meanings, al of which have the
potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is
actually settled at the moment of utterance." Id. at 426.
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possibility of monologue-any statement standing on its own. That is, no
statement can be understood without knowing the context in which the
statement is uttered, without understanding the dialogue of which that
statement is only part.
In applying Bakhtinian analysis to the common law as it changes over
time, one begins by noting that any citation appropriates the cited
opinion for the purposes and meanings of the citing opinion. This new
context effects a shift in meaning on the cited opinion; the cited opinion
will now be understood always in the context of its newest citation.6 A
Bakhtinian analysis begins to describe how this shift in meaning takes
place through the relationship of one opinion to the other.
This Comment argues that Bakhtin's theories present a valuable
addition to the use of literary theory in legal analysis. Part I offers James
Boyd White's Justice as Translation as an example of the current use of
literary theory in legal analysis7 and describes Bakhtin's theories in
relation to the analysis used by Professor White. Part II then analyzes a
line of product liability cases under Bakhtinian theories to describe the
literary relationship between judicial opinions that continues over time
and has a profound effect on change in the common law.
I. LAW, LITERATURE, AND BAKIHTIN
Law and Literature is an expanding field, one of several responses to
mainstream legal thinking that has developed in recent years. This
Comment describes only a small part of the Law and Literature field:
part of Professor White's work is used as a link between Mikhail
Bakhtin's theories and the broader corpus of Law and Literature analysis.
In moving from literary studies to legal studies, Professor White was
struck by "how similar the two enterprises were .... In particular, the
habits of close reading and textual analysis developed in literary studies
seemed very close to those required by legal training."' One of the fruits
of Professor White's efforts in bringing literary analysis to bear on legal
scholarship has been to afford legal analysis more opportunities than
were previously available.9
6. Discourse, supra note, 3 at 340.
7. Justice, supra note 1, at 160-75.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. Recognizing the literary nature of law recognizes and explores the limits placed on law's
creation of meaning: "What I have called the literary view of language ... is that all languages are
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A. Common Law Interpretation
Professor White describes law as a culture, providing a link to
Bakhtin's theories.' When law is viewed as a culture, it becomes less a
way of administering society or adjudicating disputes and more a way of
making sense of the world.1" In particular, Professor White describes law
as a "culture of argument," but the argument is not a brawl. Rather, the
argument in this culture is a resolution of conflicting ways of making
sense of the world. 2
One method by which this resolution takes place is in memorializing
adjudications in judicial opinions. 3 Unique to law, a judicial opinion
becomes an authoritative text that brings its particular resolution to the
service of those adjudicating later conflicts, carrying forward the cultural
assumptions of the earlier legal discussion. 4 Professor White brings a
literary analysis to these texts after placing his criticism between two
opposing traditions of legal analysis: a "craft" tradition and a "realist"
tradition."'
Professor White describes the craft tradition as ingrained in lawyers
from the first day of law school. Their training allows them to distinguish
good opinions from bad opinions with no great analysis of the means by
which that distinction is made. A lawyer is trained in her craft by a study
of examples of craftsmanship. In a law school classroom, the professor
presents an opinion and uses various methods to point out its flaws.
Although this general approach might not seem to offer the future lawyer
examples of good craftsmanship, the negative examples allow a lawyer
to examine her own legal reasoning and writing for similar flaws. 6 In
limited; that none says the whole truth; that full translation from one to the other is always in a deep
sense impossible." Id. at 81.
10. "For me it is more valuable to think of law in a third way, as a cultur--as a "culture of
argument"-or, what is much the same thing, as a language, as a set of ways of making sense of
things and acting in the world." Id. at xiii.
11. Id.
12. Id. at xiii-iv.
13. Id. at xvi.
14. "I read these opinions as cultural and rhetorical texts, that is, with an eye to the kind of
political and ethical community they build with their readers and to the contribution they make to the
discourse of the law." Id.
15. Id. at 93-97.
16. Id. Professor White states:
[L]aw teachers will work over a judicial opinion, testing its "reasoning," lookng for omissions
or weak arguments and the like, and leave the class with a sense, usually, of defectiveness....
294
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contrast, the realist tradition disregards the opinion and its craft to look at
the result, "piercing the felt artificiality of the words to reach the 'reality'
that lies behind the facade."' 7 The realists redirect attention from the craft
exhibited by the judge in writing an opinion to the effect of the holding
in the world. Various social science methods shift the focus of legal
analysis to the effect of'judicial holdings.'
Professor White criticizes both methods for failing to pay attention to
each other. The craft tradition offers no language to criticize opinions
while the realist tradition forgets that opinions are more than just
holdings.' Professor White offers the literary tradition of locating an
author in a particular moment when writing a particular text as one
method that addresses these failures.2"
1. Law and Literature
I start with poetry because it seems largely built on the principle I
have articulated, that we put two things together in such a way as
to make a third-different from the others yet respectful of them-
with a meaning of its own.'
Professor White uses poetry to explain the literary activity he pursues
in a legal analysis. Primarily, he argues that the constant attention to the
legal text, the constant rereading, works to bring the legal text into our
consciousness much as rereading a poem brings that "verbal artifact" into
our consciousness.2 2 This process severs our experience of the text from
one moment of reading and attaches it to the reconstructed reading that is
the result of many encounters with the text.' Law, like a poem,
establishes the author's voice, recognizes and constructs a certain
But the students are to imagine themselves doing it better and it is in this imagined
compositional process that the center of a legal education can be found.
Id. at 94.
17. Id. at 95.
18. Id. Examples of social sciences applied to legal analysis include sociology, psychology, and
economics. Id.
19. Id. at 94-95.
20. Id. at 96.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id.
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community of readers, and creates certain possibilities of language and
expression.24
Rather than using literature to prove "the inhumanity of law" or using
critical theory to carry on its own debates in a legal environment,
Professor White proposes to explore how the two fields might be put
together into a third method." The interpretative nature of law indicates
that a literary analysis might be fruitful. 6 Professor White articulates
three points of attention within his literary analysis. First, he examines
the writer's language and culture.2 Second, he examines the art by which
an author reconstitutes language and culture in her work. Third, he
examines the community of readers an author establishes through the text
she creates and offers to those readers.29 Professor White explored the
majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. White 0 to
demonstrate how attention to these three points in action helps explain a
range of traditional common law interpretations.
2. United States v. White
In White, a government informant carried a concealed transmitter
while engaging the defendant in conversations regarding narcotics
trafficking.3' Although the informant did not testify at trial, the agents
who overheard the conversations through the transmitter did. 2 The Court
held that because the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
24. Id. at 8-16. For more about the literary nature of law, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
25. "My initial question was: What happens if we look at the literature of the law as if it really
were literature, as though it defined speakers and a world, a set of possibilities for expression and
community?" Justice, supra note 1, at 17.
26. Id. at 97. An example of the new method of legal analysis created by Professor White's
bringing literary theory to bear on legal texts is described in his view of Justice Brandeis's method of
interpreting the Constitution:
In this enterprise, as Brandeis defines it, everything is involved: the intellect, the capacity to
read and express, the ability to penetrate surface forms to underlying truths, the sensitivity to
shifts in social and intellectual forms, all in the service of the wise and just definition of the
individual and his government. The reading of the Constitution is in fact a stage in the making
of the Constitution ....
Id. at 156.
27. Id. at 99.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
31. Id. at 746-47.
32. Id.
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confiding in an unworthy associate, regardless of the level of
surveillance employed, no prohibited seizure had taken place.33 Justice
White wrote the opinion for the Court, while Justice Douglas and Justice
Harlan wrote dissenting opinions.
While discussing Justice White's majority opinion, Professor White
noted that Justice White distilled a line of precedential cases into simple
propositions of law:
This is almost a caricature of old-fashioned common-law
adjudication. The cases all are authoritative, and until overruled
equally so. They stand for propositions; the sole task of the court is
to arrange those propositions in logical patterns of non-
contradiction and to fit the present case within them. All authority
is in the past, in the earlier cases. The function of the Supreme
Court, including the present opinion, is to produce a series of tags
that tell you how future cases should be decided.34
In dissent, Justice Douglas took an approach that avoided Justice
White's legalism. Citing precedent as progress towards a more
enlightened present, not as rules to follow regardless of current
circumstance, Justice Douglas did not distinguish between levels of
surveillance. Rather, he found that the Fourth Amendment required a
warrant for any kind of electronic eavesdropping.
Professor White found fault with both Justice White's and Justice
Douglas's opinions. Justice Harlan's dissent, however, Professor Whie
declared a "lesson in the reading of precedent."36 While agreeing with
Justice White that the basic question was the degree precedent would be
binding on the current situation, Justice Harlan read the previous cases
more as struggles to be understood in their context than as simple
statements of rules.37 The struggle, in any case, is to find the principles
laid down in precedent that will guide the judgment in the current case.38
Professor White called Justice Harlan a "responsible and intelligent
reader" of precedent, "far better than the literalist White or the simplistic
Douglas." '39 Agreeing with Justice Harlan that the past must mean
33. Id. at 751-54.
34. Justice, supra note 1, at 164.
35. White, 401 U.S. at 756-66 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Justice, supra note 1, at 168.
37. White, 401 U.S. at 768-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Justice, supra note 1, at 169-70.
39. Id. at 171.
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something new when read in the present, Professor White argued that
"[a]uthority thus lies in a kind of respectful interaction between mind and
material, past and present, in which each has its proper contribution to
make .... 40
Professor White's conclusion about the reading of precedent
disregards, however, how Justice Harlan's use of precedent changes the
meaning of the preceding case. Professor White and Justice Harlan
assume that the meaning intended by the original author never changes.
For them, the question is simply how that meaning is to be applied in this
new context. However, this assumption treats precedent as frozen in time
and ignores the relation of cases through time, a relationship that shifts
meaning.
3. A Fourth Point ofAttention
Justice Douglas plainly referred to cultural thoughts on surveillance,4'
but Professor White noted that Douglas's lack of connection to legal
authority would "flunk a law school exam."'42 Although Professor White
recognizes the community addressed by Justice Douglas and faults
Justice White for ignoring that community, his analysis of United States
v. White limits its examination to the relations between opinion and
community when the opinions were written; consequently his analysis
remains frozen in time. Professor White assumes precedent created a
fixed meaning addressed in different ways by the authors of the White
opinions. However, a citing author changes the meaning of the cited
precedent, in a manner consistent with the mechanisms of language
described by the theories of Mikhail Bakhtin. This shift in meaning,
created by bringing a previous text into a new context, is an important
fourth point of attention for a literary analysis of legal thought.
B. The Literary and Cultural Theories ofMikhail Bakhtin
Mikhail Bakhtin was a Russian literary theorist whose work has been
translated and digested in English within the last two decades, although
his major works were written from 1910 to 1940.4' Bakhtin noted and
described the social context underlying every utterance, verbal or
40. Id. at 172.
41. White, 401 U.S. at 756-66 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. Justice, supra note 1, at 166.
43. See supra note 3.
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written. In particular, he examined how previous utterances inhabit and
shape current utterances: "Every conversation is full of transmissions and
interpretations of other people's words." This heteroglossia-the many
explanations of meaning that are contained in any statement-requires an
understanding of dialogism, which is the dominant mode of making
meaning in a world pervaded by heteroglossia' Sometimes, the use of
another's words is direct, sometimes indirect. At all times, however, the
meaning of current utterances is shaped by the presence of those other
words, while the meaning of other words are shaped by the context of the
current utterance.46
Bakhtin describes dialogue as a three-part structure: an utterance, a
reply, and the relation between them.47 An utterance is any use of
language, and a reply is not necessarily verbal or even externalized; the
reader's enjoyment of a novel is a form of reply. The relation between
utterance and reply, however, "is the most important of the three, for
without it the other two would have no meaning. They would be isolated,
and the most primary of Bakhtinian a prioris is that nothing is anything
in itself."' Because past statements cannot be understood in isolation
from the context into which they are imported, the dialogical principle is
used to analyze the use of another's words in the speaker's context.49
When citing a case, lawyers incorporate another's words into their
own argument, the specialized discourse of lawyers. The dialogical
principle readily analyzes this process. The present argument is
obviously shaped by the cited precedent; however, the precedent is
similarly shaped by its position in the present argument. Without
analyzing both the present case and the argument, the meaning of the
cited case cannot be determined, for citation subjects precedent to a shift
in meaning."0 Traditional legal analysis refuses to acknowledge changes
in a case's meaning over time. Nevertheless, the heteroglossic context
44. Discourse, supra note 3, at 338. This Comment frequently quotes directly from Bakhtin's
writing because he has a unique way of using language that is better transmitted by using his words
directly. Also, the analyses to be applied to legal reasoning are better understood in his words than in
descriptions of his complex writing. As this Comment argues, any citation will carry a shift in
meaning; these quotations are an attempt to limit that shift while accepting its consequences. For
more about those consequences, see infra text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
45. Heteroglossia refers to the different explanations of a word's meaning. Dialogism describes
the relationship between utterances. For further definitions, see supra notes 4 and 5.
46. See Discourse, supra note 3, at 338.
47. Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World 38 (1990).
48. Id.
49. See generally id. (providing excellent description and analysis ofBakhtin's work).
50. See infra part LB.I.
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operates on all uses of another's words and brings new, even unintended,
meanings into the cited case. A dialogical analysis illuminates these
meanings.
Bakhtin discussed the fluidity of this relationship between the
discourse introduced and the new context:
Another's discourse, when introduced into a speech context, enters
the speech that frames it not in a mechanical bond but in a chemical
union (on the semantic and emotionally expressive level); the
degree of dialogized influence, one on the other, can be enormous.
For this reason we cannot, when studying the various forms for
transmitting another's speech, treat any of these forms in isolation
from the means for its contextualized (dialogizing) framing-the
one is indissolubly linked with the other."
Precedent, simply by importing another's words into the present
argument, plays the role Bakhtin assigned to quotations. Rather more
directly than in common speech, however, these quotations and
interpolations are formally recognized. Although citation and its forms
may seem to protect the quoted precedent from distortion, any use of
another's words can be understood only against the new background, and
understanding the dialogizing background begins with the simple
question, "Why is this bit of text being quoted?"52 In everyday
conversation, listeners make minute judgments about the use of another's
words in the conversations they hear and overhear. 3 In courtrooms,
chambers, classrooms, and offices, legal analysis constantly focuses on
the "why" of citation. When encountering claimed supporting authority,
judges, clerks, students, and lawyers will investigate the case cited and
determine if the citation actually agrees with the words of the cited case.
51. Discourse, supra note 3, at 340.
52. Id. at 299-300.
Thus a prose writer can distance himself from the language of his own work, while at the same
time distancing himself, in varying degrees, from the different layers and aspects of the work.
The prose writer makes use of words that are already populated with the social intentions of
others and compels them to serve his own new intentions, to serve a second master.
Id.
53. For example, the listener's evaluation of gossip is an everyday evaluation of a speaker using
another's words.
Vol. 72:291, 1997
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1. Semantic Shifts in Meaning
The following must be kept in mind: that the speech of another,
once enclosed in a context, is-no matter how accurately
transmitted-always subject to certain semantic changes. The
context embracing another's word is responsible for its dialogizing
background, whose influence can be very great.5 4
The misuse of quotations is familiar to everyone. Methods for placing
words in another context can completely change the meaning of a
quotation: "[a]ny sly and ill-disposed polemicist knows very well which
dialogizing backdrop he should bring to bear on the accurately quoted
words of his opponent, in order to distort their sense. 5 5 Traditional legal
thinking warns against such use; as a caution, judges and analysts
routinely ask "[h]ow are the facts of that case applicable to those of the
present? '" 5
6
The relation between the prior utterance and its new context, however,
requires that the prior utterance cannot be understood outside the new
context at that moment. When the judge asks why this case is cited, she
answers with the present case foremost in her mind: "In order to assess
and divine the real meaning of others' words in everyday life, the
following are surely of decisive significance: who precisely is speaking,
and under what concrete circumstances?""
The new concrete circumstances will shade the prior words with new
purpose, and thus the quotation becomes susceptible to a shift in
meaning, however slight. Bakhtin's view of the "speaking person"
clarifies this process." The speaking person is commonly viewed as a
transmitter of knowledge; for example, as we imagine a professor in
front of a classroom. A professor is imagined as holding knowledge that
she transmits to her students by speaking to them. Bakhtin, however,
viewed the speaking person as the "subject for the engaged, practical
transmission of information, and not as a means of representation." 59 A
professor in front of a classroom is not transmitting information to her
students, but is becoming a part of the internal conversation each of her
students is having about the information she speaks.
54. Discourse, supra note 3, at 340.
55. Id.
56. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842) (Alderson, B., concurring).
57. Discourse, supra note 3, at 340.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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A judicial opinion is another representation of a speaking person and
is part of the engaged transmission of information Bakhtin describes.
Engagement with a judicial opinion is easier to imagine than a professor
entering her students' minds: as one reads a judicial opinion, one
converses with it, either in one's head or perhaps by making margin
notes or using differently colored highlighters. The opinion is not merely
the transmitter of information but also part of our dialogue about the
transmitted information.
The transmission of information takes place in many modes, each
subjecting the representation of the speaking person to the demands of
transmission in that mode. Bakhtin recognized two modes that appear in
teaching language-based disciplines that will be recognized by anyone
who has gone to law school: "'reciting by heart' and 'retelling in one's
own words."'6 The latter task illustrates quite clearly how the
representation of the speaking person becomes a subject of the student's
dialogue, for the words retold must adhere to the original speaker's
meanings but also must transmit new meanings as well.6 However, this
very requirement, to join one's own meaning with the meaning of those
who spoke before, illustrates how the appropriation of another's speech
into one's own, and the added and shifted meanings resulting from the
process, underlies an individual's ideological becoming. 62
2. Ideological Becoming
As an individual appropriates others' discourse into one's own
discourse, the appropriated discourse affects one's previously developed
60. Id. at 341.
61. Id. "The latter mode poses on a small scale the task implicit in all prose stylistics: retelling a
text in one's own words is to a certain extent a double-voiced narration of another's words, for
indeed 'one's own words' must not completely dilute the quality that makes another's words unique
.. " Id.
62. Bakhtin describes the "ideological becoming" of a human being as that being's creation of her
own idea system. Ideological becoming, in part, is a struggle between two types of discourse,
"authoritative discourse" and "internally-persuasive discourse" as they are appropriated into one's
own language and belief systems. Id. at 342-46. Authoritative discourse:
[I]s privileged language that approaches us from without; it is distanced, taboo, and permits no
play with its framing context (Sacred Writ, for example).... It has great power over us, but only
while in power, if it ever becomes dethroned it immediately becomes a dead thing, a relic.
Opposed to it is internally-persuasive discourse .... which is more akin to retelling a text in
one's own words, with one's own accents, gestures, modifications.
Holquist, Dialogic Imagination, supra note 4, at 424.
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and continually developing belief systems.63 Ideological development
occurs when another's words begin to lose their merely descriptive
purpose and "strive[] rather to determine the very bases of our
ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of our
behavior .... ,6 In a sense, words that had merely described positions
encountered in the world come to explain positions held for oneself. Just
as individuals exhibit an ideological becoming through their
appropriation of the language of others, the law alters its rules as each of
the law's authors appropriate precedent and apply it to the case at hand.
Within a judicial opinion, this sense of ideological becoming appears
as the position argued by one side comes to explain the holding of the
court. This process, so familiar as to be almost unnoticed, masks the
movement of meaning in the opinion. As precedent is cited by litigants, it
is invested with authority. Should the court decide the precedent applies
to the present case, it becomes persuasive. This movement in meaning
matches that described by Bakhtin.6' As another's words shift in meaning
during an individual's ideological becoming, so does the meaning of
cases cited in judicial writing. Moreover, the words of others are rarely
both authoritative and internally persuasive on an individual level.66 In
judicial opinions, however, precedent is usually assumed to be both
authoritative (carrying the weight of law) and internally persuasive
(applying to the given set of facts). Before exploring the tensions
between these two positions for precedent, each position will be analyzed
individually.
a. Authoritative Discourse
Authoritative discourse, coming from outside the speaker, always
precedes the current discourse; it is older and ranks higher.67 Further,
"[t]he authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it[,] ... it binds
us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us
internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it[,]...
organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically
63. Ideological becoming should not be confused with political development of any sort.
.'Ideology' in Russian is simply an idea-system. But it is semiotic in the sense that it involves the
concrete exchange of signs in society and in history. Every word/discourse betrays the ideology of
its speaker ... " Holquist, Dialogic Imagination, supra note 4, at 429.
64. Discourse, supra note 3, at 342.
65. Seeid. at340-41.
66. Id. at 342. Authoritative and internally persuasive discourse are defined supra note 62.
67. Discourse, supra note 3, at 342.
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higher."68 Use of legal precedent appears authoritative, particularly in the
form of citation. The use of complicated forms to cite authority demands
attention and allegiance. Lawyers must know the sources of their
authority and through these sources prove the strength of the cited
authority. Bakhtin's note that authoritative discourse may "organize
around itself great masses of other types of discourses (which interpret it,
praise it, apply it in various ways) ....",69 describes the vast material
surrounding the case and statutes that constitute the law.
When cases and statutes are incorporated into new discourses of the
law, either commentary or later cases, citation form insures that the
authoritative discourse of the law will not intermingle with the discourse
surrounding the citation. Here, another's words-in the form of earlier
law-enter the present argument "as a compact and indivisible mass."7
Its strength in the present argument rests on the validity of its authority;
hence, the constant search for updated statutes and rulings.
"Authoritative discourse cannot be represented-it is only
transmitted."' Bakhtin asserts this limit while discussing how
authoritative discourse appears in novels. Because novels are an artistic
form, interested in representing more than transmitting, authoritative
discourse has little import for novels.72 However, the static nature of
authoritative discourse has effects within law, a genre of authoritative
texts. When cited, authoritative discourse becomes subject to the
discourses surrounding it; in a case, precedent is interpreted by briefs and
opinions. Eventually the interpretations guide whether the precedent
cited will become persuasive.
b. Internally Persuasive Discourse
In an individual's ideological becoming, one begins to distinguish
between one's own discourse and others' discourses, at first creating "a
separation between internally persuasive discourse and authoritarian
enforced discourse, along with a rejection of those congeries of
discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch us."73 Internally
persuasive discourse expresses values held true even if "backed up by no
68. Id.
69. Id. at 343.
70. Id.
71. Id. at344.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 345.
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authority at all.., not even acknowledged in society (not by public
opinion, nor by scholarly norms, nor by criticism), not even in the legal
code."'74 As new situations appear, the appropriate authoritative discourse
is integrated to some degree with our internal discourse, creating new
discourses that guide our responses. Although authoritative discourses
are finite and fixed, "[t]he semantic structure of an internally persuasive
discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that
dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean."'75
As each case presents cited precedent, the legal rules are extracted and
applied to a new fact pattern; internal persuasion is drafted from
authority. The law also appropriates discourses from outside its
recognized line of precedent and recognizes their persuasiveness. For
example, many a judicial opinion relies on the public interest served by
the decision reached in the opinion.76
The interplay between authoritative discourse and internally
persuasive discourse in the law is often discussed, even in basic legal
analysis. First-year students are taught to find each case's rationale.
Bakhtin's discussion of an individual's ideological becoming, however,
offers legal analysis an important understanding of the change in
meaning over time that examining each individual opinion's rationale
ignores. As the common law develops over time, as its belief system
shifts over decades, the citation of precedent changes the meaning of that
precedent. Opinions cited in a later case will never mean what they once
meant, and that shift will affect future developments in the law's
ideology. One example of a line of product liability cases spanning over
a century illustrates this shift.
II. AN EXAMPLE OF CASE ANALYSIS
A. The Brief Story of a JL
Basic Legal Skills is the first-year legal writing and research course at
the University of Washington School of Law; the course would be
familiar to any law school student or graduate. Basic Legal Skills teaches
the writing, research, and analysis necessary for the first-year study of
substantive and procedural law.
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id. at 346.
76. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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In the first weeks of Basic Legal Skills, students are handed a line of
product liability cases beginning with Sexias v. Woods7 7 and ending with
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.71 The cases, taken from Legal Method:
Cases and Text Materials,79 are used to teach "a 'feel' for certain of the
basic skills and arts of the case lawyer: [for example], the distinguishing
of cases on their facts, the narrowing of an asserted precedent in terms of
its procedural issue, the following of the distinguishable case.""0 The first
Basic Legal Skills assignments are to brief the cases and then discuss and
write about the consistency, or lack of consistency, among them. The
challenge is to separate holding from dictum, an "elusive" task." Legal
Method presents MacPherson as an apparent departure from the previous
cases because unlike them it held that a distant manufacturer who had no
privity with the injured party could nevertheless be sued for harm caused
by the manufacturer's dangerous product. The instructor asked: "Is the
decision [in MacPherson] consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis?
Does it matter?"82
The literary nature of judicial opinions offers one explanation for the
inconsistency of holdings over time.83 Nevertheless, methods other than
those offered by mainstream legal thinking were not offered by Basic
Legal Skills. The work in this class closely followed Professor White's
craft tradition of legal analysis.84 Instead of exploring other literary
aspects of the opinions read in those first weeks, the Basic Legal Skills
curriculum assumed only that cases are "thought to present a series of
reasoned positions that [are] available for analysis by anyone trained in
simple [legal] operations." 85 Although legal scholarship has continually
branched out, such fields as Critical Legal Studies, Legal Realism,
Feminist Legal Theory, and others had no place in the first weeks of
Basic Legal Skills.
77. 2 Cai. Cas. 48 (N.Y. 1804) (ruling against plaintiff on appeal where buyer sued seller over
purchase of mislabeled wood).
78. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (purchaser sued original manufacturer of automobile after crash
was caused by defective tire).
79. Harry W. Jones et al., Legal Method: Cases and Text Materials 134-74 (1980).
80. Id at 112.
81. Id. at 113.
82. Katherine O'Neill et al., University of Wash. Sch. of Law, Syllabus for Basic Legal Skills 3
(Fall Quarter 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with Washington Law Review).
83. For discussion on the literary nature of law, see supra text accompanying notes 8-14 and 26-
29.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
85. Mark Poster, Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15, 15 (1985).
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B. Authority That Does Not Persuade: Levy in Winterbottom
Winterbottom v. Wright8 6 set the course of product liability law for
seventy-five years." The defendant, a supplier of coaches, was sued by a
separately-employed driver of horses who was injured when the coach
collapsed.8 The defendant and his attorneys described the possible
horrors of liability extended without limit,89 following the then current
legal principle:
Now it is a general rule [said the defense], that wherever a wrong
arises merely out of the breach of a contract,... the party who
made the contract alone can sue.... If the plaintiff may, as in this
case, run through the length of three contracts, he may run through
any number or series of them.90
The plaintiff argued, however, that the dangerous character of the
defective coach breached the wall of privity and allowed the driver to
claim damages against the coach owner.9'
The tension between the defendant's view of limited liability and the
plaintiff's view of expanded liability appeared in the discussion of Levy
v. Langridge,92 an earlier case where an injured son was allowed to sue
the gun seller even though his father purchased the injuring gun.
Winterbottom argued that his case was governed by Levy.9' This act of
citation invested the precedent with authority simply by referring to it as
written law. As any lawyer would, Winterbottom's attorney used this
invested authority to hide an argument within the precedent; that is, he
argued that these were not his original ideas but merely the application of
the ideas of learned judges.
Nonetheless, the task faced by the lawyer is always to find precedent
that, as well as being authoritative, is internally persuasive and applicable
to this case. This search for persuasive precedent and its application to
new fact patterns causes the meaning of the precedent to shift as it enters
the new context. Whether or not the judge finds the precedent persuasive,
the seed has been planted. From this moment forward, the precedent can
86. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
87. John W. Wade, Strict Product Liability: A Look at its Evolution, The Brief, Fall 1989, at 8, 11.
88. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402-03.
89. Wade, supra note 87, at 10.
90. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at404.
92. 150 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1459 (Ex. Ch. 1838).
93. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
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and will be imagined in this context. That imaginative act adds to the
precedent's accumulation of legal meaning over time.
In other words, because the argument was made in Winterbottom, one
can imagine the principles of Levy extending beyond the contract, even if
the Winterbottom judges would not agree. The seed has been planted,
although the fruitfulness of the legal soil may not appear at first.
In Winterbottom, the judge did not find Levy persuasive as it:
[W]holly fail[ed] as an authority in [the plaintiffs] favour; for there
the gun was bought for the use of the son, the plaintiff in that
action, who could not make the bargain himself, but was really and
substantially the party contracting. Here the action is brought
simply because the defendant was a contractor with a third person;
and it is contended that thereupon he became liable tc every body
who might use the carriage.94
Lord Abinger, the presiding judge, acknowledged the possibility that
Winterbottom's suit might allow many more similar actions if allowed:
"We ought not to permit a doubt to rest upon this subject, for our doing
so might be the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions.""5 Lord
Abinger was amazed that Winterbottom had arisen despite "the
precautions which were taken, in the judgment of this Court in the case
of Levy v. Langridge, to obviate any notion that such an action could be
maintained."96 In anticipating the cases he wouldn't allow, however,
Lord Abinger did not realize he planted the seeds for such cases'
eventual success.
The difficulty of determining holding from dicta might explain why
Winterbottom's attorneys brought the action. However, the judicial and
legal process of characterizing the facts of cases more clearly explains
how Winterbottom arose even though the Levy court clearly did not
foresee such actions. The gun seller in Levy knew the gun's intended user
was outside the contract between him and the purchaser, the user's
father.97 Therefore, Winterbottom characterized his case as representing a
user known to exist outside the contract.9" This characterization was
designed to bring the case within the Levy rule. The closer the analogy
between facts, the less noticeable the semantic shift of the cited
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1458.
98. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
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precedent. By carefully characterizing his own case, Winterbottom hoped
the court would find the shift in Levy's meaning acceptable. The court
held that the coach-maker did not have knowledge similar to the gun
seller's: Winterbottom suffers because "[t]he contract in this case was
made with the Postmaster-General alone."99 The court distinguished
Winterbottom's contract from the one in Levy. However, by recognizing
that the argument could be made, the court shifted the meaning of Levy
such that it could no longer be read outside the context of the
Winterbottom argument.
The Winterbottom court agreed with the defendant and erected the
"citadel of privity" that limited product liability to those related by
contractual privity for most of the next century.' By recording the
plaintiffs idea of expected use and inherent danger, however, the court
planted in Winterbottom v. Wright the seeds of that decision's overturn in
MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.' The process, however, took place by a
slow accretion of slight semantic shifts over the course of seventy-four
years. The first shift occurred in Thomas v. Winchester 2 when the New
York Court of Appeals found an exception to the Winterbottom rule.
C. Persuasion With No Authority: Winterbottom in Thomas
After Mrs. Thomas almost died from ingesting poison mislabeled as
medicine, she and her husband sued Winchester, the original
manufacturer of the poison, who had sold it to a wholesaler who had then
sold it to a pharmacist who had then sold it to Mr. Thomas.0 3 The
Thomases' relationship to the tortfeasor was even further removed than
in Winterbottom, and therefore the defendant manufacturer claimed the
case should fail."° Indeed, Chief Judge Ruggles agreed that the lack of
contract would have prevented the suit under the Winterbottom
precedent."5 However, "the case in hand stands on a different ground"'0 6
99. Id. at 405.
100. Wade, supra note 87, at 11.
101. 111N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
102. 6 N.Y. 381 (N.Y. 1852).
103. Id. at 382-83.
104. Id. at 384 ("[TIhe action could not be sustained, as the defendant was the remote vendor of
the article in question; and there was no connection, transaction or privity between him and the
plaintiffs, or either of them.").
105. "If, in labeling a poisonous drug with the name of a harmless medicine, for public market, no
duty was violated by the defendant, excepting that which he owed to Aspinwall, his immediate
vendee, in virtue of his contract of sale, this action cannot be maintained." Id. at 386. The court went
on to describe the Winterbottom action as the best example of the limit to product liability: "This was
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because "[t]he defendant's negligence put human life in imminent
danger.' ' 11 7 Where Wright's duty arose from his contract with the
Postmaster-General, Winchester's duty arose from "the nature of his
business, and the danger to others incident to its mismanagement."'0 8
The creation of an exception for an imminently dangerous article was
also attempted in Winterbottom when Winterbottom's attorney
characterized the defectively manufactured coach as "necessarily
dangerous."'0 9 That court, however, recognized only taking of a public
duty or creating a public nuisance as exceptions to the privity required
for a suit."' In allowing the Thomases' action, Chief Judge Ruggles
characterized Wright's duty as a public one: "Can it be said, that there
was no duty on the part of the defendant, to avoid the creation of that
danger, by the exercise of greater caution?""' This indirect quotation
shifts the court's task from looking to see if the tortfeasor has accepted a
public duty to imposing one on him as a matter of law.
Just as Levy allowed an exception to a general rule that lawyers tried
to exploit in Winterbottom, lawyers later seized upon the public-duty
exception opened in Thomas. Loop v. Litchfield' 2 and Devdin v. Smith"'
offer two examples of how positioning precedent allows or forecloses the
success of that attempted exploitation.
First, in Loop v. Litchfield, the court discussed Thomas and recognized
the public-duty exception." 4 Although Loop attempted to describe the
the ground on which the case of Winterbottom v. Wright was decided.... The reason of the decision
is best stated by Baron Rolfe: A.'s duty to keep the coach in good condition, was a duty to the
postmaster-general [sic], with whom he made his contract, and not to the driver employed by the
owners of the horses." Id. at 387.
106. Id.
107. Id. at388.
108. Id. at389.
109. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404 (Ex. 1842).
110. Id. at405.
111. Thomas, 6 N.Y. at 388-89.
112. 42 N.Y. 351 (1870). Defendant's sold a defective fly wheel, giving notice to the purchaser.
Plaintiffs' decedent used the fly wheel with the purchaser's permission and was killed when the
defect caused the wheel to burst. Plaintiffs sued defendant for causing death by negligence. Id. at
351-52.
113. 89 N.Y. 470 (1882). Defendant built a scaffold for the plaintiff's decedent's employer. While
using it to paint a great height, the scaffold gave way, causing decedent's death. Acknowledging that
no privity between defendant and decedent existed, the court nonetheless held that defective
construction of the scaffold made it inherently dangerous to any workman using ir. Id. at 478.
114. Loop, 42 N.Y. at 358-59.
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"fly wheel in question [as] a dangerous object,"" 5 the court found his
attempt unpersuasive:
Poison is a dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is
a dangerous instrument, as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle or the like.
They are instruments and articles in their nature calculated to do
injury to mankind, and generally intended to accomplish that
purpose. They are essentially, and in their elements, instruments of
danger. Not so, however, an iron wheel .... 16
Judge Hunt, for the Loop court, described Thomas in great detail;'
17
however, his description focused on a principle of liability not used by
the Thomas majority. Although Chief Judge Ruggles discussed the
criminal liability that would ensue had Mrs. Thomas died, he did not
ascribe the civil liability on that basis. Rather, a duty arising from the
marketing of medicines and poisons was the basis for liability."1
Nonetheless, Judge Hunt declared that the Thomas decision was founded
on the crime of the negligent sale of poisons." 9 This positioned Thomas
as unpersuasive authority, similar to the way that the Winterbottom court
positioned Levy. Where the Winterbottom court attempted to limit the
meaning of liability, the Loop court attempted to limit the meaning of
danger. Similarly, however, each attempt plants the seeds for a later
court's expansion of each discussed term's meaning.
Second, in Devlin v. Smith, the court described Thomas with an
entirely different characterization: "This liability [for selling a mislabeled
poison] was held to rest, not upon any contract or direct privity between
him and the party injured, but upon the duty which the law imposes on
every one to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." 20
Such a shift in emphasis alters the meaning of Thomas from the Loop
court's emphasis on danger to the Devlin court's emphasis on duty.
Again, the court will impose a duty upon the tortfeasor as a matter of
law. This imposition, however, remained an exception to the general
115. Id.
116. Id. at 359.
117. Id. at 357-58. The description includes the description of Winterbottom, using Baron Rolfe's
alphabet characters without credit. Id. at 358.
118. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 381, 388-89 (1852). The concurring opinion, however, would
have found liability because selling an unlabelled poison was a misdemeanor, but did not opine
whether liability would result otherwise. Jones, supra note 79, at 142.
119. Loop, 42 N.Y. at 359.
120. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470,477 (1882).
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requirement of privity. 2 ' By this time, Winterbottom had set the rule-
privity was required in a suit for negligence-for forty years with few
exceptions to that rule. Winterbottom's authority would last for thirty
more years before the context of the exceptions would overpower its
holding and Winterbottom's meaning would shift from rule to exception.
D. Old Authority Abandoned While Persuasion Takes its Place:
Winterbottom and Thomas in MacPherson
The state of American product liability law in 1903 was summarized
in Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co."Z Following Winterbottom
v. Wright, liability was allowed without privity of contract under three
exceptions: first, an imminently dangerous act of negligence; second,
negligence causing injury to an invitee; and third, selling an imminently
dangerous object without notice of the danger." Finding only two cases,
including Devlin v. Smith, that allowed liability outside these exceptions,
Judge Sanborn declared:
It is, perhaps, more remarkable that the current of decisions
throughout all the courts of England and the United States should
be so uniform and conclusive in support of this rule, and that there
should, in the multitude of opinions, be but one or twc, in conflict
with it, than it is that such sporadic cases should be found. They are
insufficient in themselves, or in the reasoning they contain, to
overthrow or shake the established rule which prevails throughout
the English speaking nations. 24
Only thirteen years later, this "established rule" would be overthrown in
New York.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 12 involved a plaintiff who shared as
little privity with the defendant as Mrs. Thomas shared with the negligent
manufacturer; indeed, perhaps less. MacPherson purchased a car from a
dealer who had purchased it from Buick. Buick had purchased the
defective wheel from another manufacturer. The defects could have been
discovered with reasonable inspection anywhere along the route from
manufacture to accident. 26 There was no claim, however, of fraud: "The
121. Id. at 477-78.
122. 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
123. Id. at 870-71.
124. Id. at 870.
125. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
126. Id. at 1050-51.
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question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care
and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser.
'1 27
The question of duty of care had previously been phrased as a narrow
exception from the requirement of privity; Chief Judge Ruggles
considered Thomas such an exception.128 However, Judge Cardozo,
writing the MacPherson opinion, viewed Thomas v. Winchester as the
rule not the exception: "The foundations of this branch of law, at least in
this state, were laid in Thomas v. Winchester .... Because the danger is
to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury.' 129
After dismissing Loop v. Litchfield as a "narrow construction of the
rule,"'30 Cardozo used Devlin v. Smith as the first example of later cases
with "more liberal" applications of the Thomas rule.' From this,
Cardozo found that later cases may "have extended the rule of Thomas v.
Winchester. If so, this court is committed to the extension ...
[W]hatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has
no longer that restricted meaning."'
32
This shift from exception to rule had been presaged in the discussion
of Thomas in Devlin. Indeed, it started in the discussion of Levy by
Winterbottom's lawyers3  and was warned against by Lord Abinger.
Lord Abinger feared that the expansive view of liability asked for by
Winterbottom would open the door to many undesired actions. 5 Chief
Judge Ruggles also wished to prevent undesired actions by limiting non-
contractual actions to dangerous manufactures. 3 6 However, Cardozo
quoted Thomas as rule, not exception, and shifted the meaning of
Thomas and Winterbottom.
The key shift in meaning came from classifying the cases cited in
Thomas as exceptions to the rule established in Winterbottom. Whereas
Chief Judge Ruggles cited cases to show the limits of liability to which
127. Id. at 1051.
128. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 381, 389 (1852).
129. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 1052. Cardozo also considered and dismissed Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
Losee involved a third party injured by an exploding boiler who was found to have no claim against
the manufacturer of the boiler, this case closely followed Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 358-59
(1870).
131. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
132. Id.
133. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,404 (Ex. 1842).
134. Id. at 404-05.
135. Id. at 405.
136. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 381, 387-89 (1852).
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he found an exception, Judge Cardozo interpreted the cases as exceptions
to the rule defined in Thomas. That is, he positioned Thomas as the
authority under which persuasive exceptions were found. This move
completed the ideological process of integrating the individual
persuasive voice represented by Thomas with the authoritative voice of
the judge announcing the law.
Bakhtin argued that the processes of assimilating other's discourse
into one's own was a part of the process by which an individual
determines "the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the
world."' 37 Part of this process is played out by encountering others'
voices as authoritative discourse or bringing them to internally
persuasive discourse. 3 In the development of the law, persuasive
arguments that are contrary to the general rule of law are positioned as
exceptions to that rule. 39 As exceptions develop and as the law develops
new ideological relations with the society of which it is a part, those
exceptions can be positioned as the rule, with the full authority of the
law. The path of the Levy exception, particularly as it was developed in
Thomas, illustrates that shift in position and the shift in meaning which
accompanies it.
There can be many explanations for a court's meaning.
Winterbottom's lawyers attempted to explain Levy in one way; the
Winterbottom court explained it in another way. These different
explanations of a case's meaning illustrate the legal heteroglossia that
affects the meaning of any case because at any time the conditions of
understanding a case's meaning will be different. 4  The shifts of
meaning in the line of product liability cases following Winterbottom
illustrate the usefulness of Bakhtin's theories in understanding this
condition of change in legal meaning.
The Bakhtinian analysis demonstrated here will not reveal which
seeds of shifting legal meaning will blossom. However, this analysis
does reveal which seeds landed on fruitful soil by tracing the shifts in a
constantly growing field of legal meaning.
137. Discourse, supra note 3, at 342.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Huset v. M. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
140. Compare with the definition of heteroglossia, supra note 4.
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